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MITSUBISHI, INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION, AND THE LAW OF STATE
IMMUNITY
CHARLES H. BROWER II
I will not be the first to say that "[i]t is easy to love a beautiful

child."1 It is much harder to endure the painful recitation of her
shortcomings and missteps,2 and all the more so when pronounced by
luminaries whose opinions demand consideration and respect. One,
therefore, recoils at the words of United States Supreme Court
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the dissent in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., that "international
arbitration will only succeed if ... limited to tasks it is capable of
performing well-the . . . resolution of essentially contractual

disputes between commercial partners. As for matters involving the
political passions and the fundamental interests of nations, .
international arbitration is incapable of achieving satisfactory
results."3

One likewise shrinks before the notorious submission of Canada's
Attorney General in the Metalcladjudicial review that "the awards of

Croft Associate Professor of International Law and Jessie D. Puckett, Jr.
Lecturer, University of Mississippi School of Law. This paper represents an
elaboration on remarks delivered at the London Court of International
Arbitration/Ogilvy-Renault Symposium (Montreal, Oct. 2004) and the American
Branch of the International Law Association's International Law Weekend (New
York, Oct. 2004).
1. See Jan Paulsson, Accepting International Arbitration in Fact-And Not

Only in Words, in

ARBITRATION IN AFRICA

31, 31 (Eugene Cotran & Austin

Amissah eds., 1996).
2. See id. (comparing the ease of taking pride in the achievements of one's
children with the difficulties of accepting their failures and mistakes).
3. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
665 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Chapter 11 tribunals about public measures are not supposed to be
worthy of judicial deference and not supposed to be protected by a
high standard of review. '4 Momentarily refreshed by the false hope
that we have already seen the worst, one opens the New York Times
on September 27, 2004, only to find the indictment that "the
arbitration process

. . .

is often one-sided, favoring well-heeled

corporations over poor countries, and must be made fairer than it is
today. Unlike trials, arbitrations take place in secret. There is no
room in the process to hear people who might be hurt ....There is

no appeal."5
Some two decades after Mitsubishi, a crisis still looms. From the
apex of the legal profession, from the highest strata of government,
from those who shape public opinion, we continue to hear that the
reach of arbitration exceeds its grasp: the traits that won popularity
for arbitration in its youth do not qualify it for the mature task of
responsible governance.
One must, of course, keep things in perspective. Justice Stevens
wrote for the dissent in Mitsubishi. Furthermore, at least in theory,
the arguments of Canada's Attorney General failed in at least three
cases to provoke open resistance to the authority of Chapter 11
tribunals.6 So, even in the face of doubt, one may have faith in the
4. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., Outline of Argument of

Intervenor Attorney General of Canada, para. 25 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001) (emphasis
added),

available

at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sphp-pages/importa/

solcontro/consultoria/CasosMexico/Metalclad/BC-SCJ/escritocanada.pdf
visited Mar. 14, 2005).

(last

5. The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at A30.
6. See Canada v. S.D. Myers, Inc., 2004 F.C. 38, 2004 CarswellNat 94, paras.
35, 38, 41, 43 (Can. Fed. Ct. 2004) (repeatedly mentioning the court's "limited

jurisdiction" to review arbitral awards); United Mexican States v. Karpa, 2003
CarswellOnt 4929, paras. 57, 81 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. 2003) (according a "high level
of deference" to the tribunal's decision and reiterating the "very limited
opportunity for the courts to provide any recourse against an award"), availableat
2003 WL 22846522, aff'd, 2005 CarswellOnt 32, paras. 34, 41-43 (Ont. Ct. App.

2005) (emphasizing the need for a "high degree" of judicial deference towards, and
sparing recourse to judicial interference with, awards issued by tribunals under
NAFTA's investment chapter), available at 2005 WL 95624; United Mexican

States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 664, 2001 CarswellBC 995, para. 50
(B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001) (referring to the "limited" extent of judicial review
contemplated by the British Columbia statute governing international arbitral
awards).

Notwithstanding

its

deferential

rhetoric,

the

Metalclad court
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capacity of arbitration to respond to its critics. But let us consider the
particular steps that arbitration must take to meet the charges against
it.
To defeat the residual hostility towards arbitration of routine
commercial disputes in the last century, the arbitration bar called on
judges to undertake a so-called "test of love": to overcome their
"immediate dislike" and to embrace a "higher principle," namely, the
promotion of international commerce. 7 Thus, with an air of
superiority, the arbitration bar greeted that early reputational crisis by
calling on outsiders to abandon their primitive impulses in favor of
enlightened views. Although that campaign succeeded, reliance on
past victories often breeds future defeats.8 Classic battle strategies
9
devised in the nineteenth century proved ineffective in World War 1.
Tactics honed in World War II, and even thereafter, will likely prove
useless in Iraq and in the so-called "Global War on Terror.""0 One

surreptitiously applied a heightened standard of review to the tribunal's
interpretation of "fair and equitable treatment," as well as its application of
precedent regarding de facto expropriation of property. Metalclad, supra, paras.
64-76, 80; see also Jos& E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Hal) Truths and
Consequences, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 405, 415 n.49 (2003); Charles H. Brower, II,
Beware the Jabberwock."A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
465, 476-79 (2002) [hereinafter Brower, Beware the Jabberwock]; Charles H.
Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 66-68 (2001) [hereinafter Brower, The Empire
Strikes Back]; Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's
Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 47 (2003) [hereinafter
Brower, Legitimacy]; Charles N. Brower et al., The Coming Crisis in the Global
Adjudication System, 19 ARB. INT'L 415, 430-32 (2003) [hereinafter Brower et al.,
The Coming Crisis]; Charles N. Brower, NAFTA's Investment Chapter: Dynamic
Laboratory,Failed Experiments, and Lessons for the FTAA, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 251, 255 (2003) [hereinafter Brower, Dynamic Laboratory].
7. Paulsson, supra note 1, at 31-33.
8. See Dan Baum, Battle Lessons, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2005, at 42-43
(observing that "[e]very war is different from the last, with its own special learning
curve").
9. See id. ("In the First World War, the French, British, and German troops
persisted in attempting to storm trenches before recognizing the defensive
supremacy of the machine gun.").
10. See id. (explaining that, in Iraq, "the army's marquee high-tech weapons
are often sidelined while the enemy kills and maims Americans with bombs wired
to garage-door openers or doorbells"); Greg Jaffe, Trial by Fire: On Ground in
Iraq, Capt. Ayers Writes His Own Playbook, WALL STREET J., Sept. 22, 2004, at
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must therefore consider whether the old arguments for arbitration
adequately respond to modem concerns about its use for the
settlement of regulatory disputes.
With the inquiry properly framed, let us return to Mitsubishi, in
which the Supreme Court first recognized the arbitrability of antitrust
claims for international transactions and, furthermore, instructed
national courts to "shake off the old hostility to arbitration."' I Taking
the Court's rhetoric at face value, people commonly regard the
decision as a triumph for the principle that national institutions must
cast aside suspicion, adjust to the needs of arbitration, and accept its
natural beauty as a means for resolving disputes, whether grounded
in private or public law. 2 Not so!
Recall that the outcome in Mitsubishi depended on the tribunal's
consent to apply U.S. mandatory law, as would a U.S. court, instead
of applying the Swiss law chosen by the parties.' 3 In other words, the
Supreme Court required tribunals and courts to make complimentary
adjustments. Arbitrators first had to agree to conduct themselves
Al (indicating that, in Vietnam, "the Army fought essentially as it had in World
War II, with large formations commanded by senior officers and lots of
firepower," but suggesting that "the Army's success in Iraq will depend largely on
the ability of officers on the ground to come up with new solutions").
11. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
638 (1985) (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d
978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
12. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE 15658, 160 (1996) (describing Mitsubishi as a "pivotal case" in which the Supreme
Court first recognized the "elite image" of international commercial arbitration,
"set out to accommodate international commercial arbitration," and redefined "the
willingness of U.S. courts to make space" for arbitration by providing it with
"greater independence from the courts"). Compare Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629,
638 (emphasizing "concerns [for] international comity, respect for the capacities of
... transnational tribunals ....

sensitivity to the need[s] of the international

commercial system," and the potential of arbitration "to take a central place in the
international legal order"), with id. at 641, 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court's tendency to rely on "vague notions of international comity" and to
depict international commercial arbitration as an "institution designed to
implement a formula for world peace").
13. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37 n.19; see also Matthias Lehmann, A Plea
for a TransnationalApproach to Arbitrability in Arbitral Practice, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 753, 771 (2004) (emphasizing the Supreme Court's expectation in
Mitsubishi that "arbitrators apply mandatory rules even if in doing so they
contravene the parties' explicit choice of law").
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more like judges charged with responsibility for the public interest.
Only then did the Supreme Court require its brethren to cast aside
their traditional resistance toward the arbitration of regulatory
disputes. The message should be clear: arbitration can handle an
increasing share of the public's business without provoking a crisis,
but only at a price; tribunals must commit themselves to act more
4
like their judicial counterparts.1
Applying the lessons of Mitsubishi to investor-state arbitration,
one might counsel its proponents to reconstitute the system more in
the image of a judicial process. 5 The value of that advice, however,
depends on the availability of a suitable template to guide the
transformation. Although the relationship between investor-state
arbitration and the law of state immunity may not be obvious, and
one must not push the analogy too far, the two traditions share
common foundations. Both respond to the growing frequency of
encounters between private businesses and foreign states. 16 Both seek
14. See Brower et al., The Coming Crisis, supra note 6, at 417-18 (indicating
that, as arbitral tribunals have increasingly substituted for national courts, their
proceedings have inevitably taken on more of the characteristics of judicial
proceedings); cf Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 656-57, 666 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the "rudimentary procedures" used in arbitration, concluding that they
lack "even the most elementary guarantees of fair process," and touting the virtues
of a judicial system based on "[c]onsideration of a fully developed record by a
jury, instructed in the law by a federal judge, and subject to appellate review").
15. Cf Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 91-92 (proposing the introduction
of an Appellate Body with a "judicial" character that would enhance the level of
predictability, coherence, and transparency of arbitration under NAFTA's
investment chapter).
16. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES 11-12 (1995) (explaining that as "[p]rivate foreign investment has ...
increasingly come to play an integral role" in the economic advancement of
developing states, "BITs have served to establish the rules according to which such
investments could be safeguarded"); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES
INVESTMENT TREATIES 20-21 (1992) (identifying the growing sums of capital
placed by U.S. investors in developing states, and their increasing vulnerability to
expropriation, as part of the impetus for the U.S. BIT program); Brower,
Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 69-70 (indicating that, with the growth of cross-border
investment, disputes under investment treaties will arise more often between
foreign investors and their host states); Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who
Then Should Judge?: Developing the International Rule of Law Under NAFTA
Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 193, 195 (2001) (suggesting that high volumes of
cross-border investment make recourse to investor-state arbitration inevitable); see
also Jurisdictionof U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R.
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to ensure that businesses have access to normal procedures for legal
redress in their dealings with foreign states. 7 Both aim to
depoliticize the assertion of claims against foreign states. 8 In so
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong. 24 (1976) (testimony of Monroe Leigh,
Legal Advisor, Dept. of State) [hereinafter Hearings] (noting the increasing
frequency with which "our citizens have legal rights that come into contact with
foreign governments and their agencies"); id. at 80 (testimony of Cecil J.
Olmstead, Chairman, Rule of Law Comm., and Vice President, Texaco Inc.)
(mentioning "the increasing advent of foreign governments and their entities upon
the commercial and business scene"); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605 (pointing out that "American citizens
are increasingly coming into contact with foreign states and entities owned by
foreign states"); S. REP. No. 94-13 10, at 8 (1976) ("In [today's] modern world...
foreign state enterprises are every day participants in commercial activity.").
17. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.U.S., art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. 605, 642 [hereinafter NAFTA] (establishing a
"mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures ...

due process

before an impartial tribunal"); Charles H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes
Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fear and Equilibrium, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 52 (2001)
(asserting that "[a]ny system for resolving investor-state disputes ... must provide
investors with liberal access to a forum in which to present complaints" against
host states); see also Hearings,supra note 16, at 24 (testimony of Monroe Leigh)
(stating that "the general purpose" of the FSIA "is simple: [t]o assure that
American citizens are not deprived of normal legal redress against foreign states");
H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605 (observing
that the growing number of interactions between private businesses and foreign
states "call[s] into question whether our citizens will have access to the courts in
order to resolve ordinary legal disputes").
18. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 475-76 (4th ed. 2004); STEPHEN J.
TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 223, 395 (1990); VANDEVELDE,
supra note 16, at 25; Brower, supra note 17, at 47, 51; Brower, Legitimacy, supra
note 6, at 65; Brower & Steven, supra note 16, at 195; Daniel M. Price, Some
Observations on ChapterEleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
421, 427 (2000) (all identifying depoliticization of disputes as a purpose animating
the arbitration of disputes under investment treaties); see also Hearings,supra note
16, at 29 (testimony of Monroe Leigh), id. at 31 (testimony of Bruno A. Ristau,
Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division, Dept. of Justice); id. at 60
(testimony of Peter D. Trooboff, Attorney, Covington & Burling); id. at 71 (letter
from Timothy W. Stanley, President, International Economic Policy Association,

to Hon. Walter Flowers, Chairman, Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental
Relations, House Comm. on the Judiciary (June 24, 1976)); id. at 80 (testimony of
Cecil J. Olmstead); Letter from Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Sec'y of State, and
Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen., to Hon. Nelson D. Rockefeller, President
of the Senate (Oct. 31, 1975), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 88, 88 [hereinafter Letter

from Ingersoll];

JOSEPH

W.

DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND
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doing, both must strike a balance between the interests of claimants
in obtaining remedies and the interests of states in conducting public
affairs without interference. 9 Both, thus, serve as key landmarks on
the road from a power-based to a rules-based system of international
relations.2° Considering these many points of intersection, one may at

THEIR CORPORATIONS 34 (2d ed. 2003); Charles H. Brower, II, Removal from

State Court Under the FSIA: Escape Hatch or Booby Trap?, 9 WILLAMETTE J.
INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL. 1, 1 (2001) [hereinafter Brower, Removal from State
Court Under the FSIA] (all identifying depoliticization of disputes as a purpose
animating the FSIA).
19. See Brower, supra note 17, at 52 ("Any system for resolving investor-state
disputes must balance two objectives. First, it must provide investors with liberal
access to a forum in which to present complaints. Second, the selected mechanism
must not create ideal standards that conflict with the regular practices of most
orderly states."); id. at 85 ("Chapter 11 tribunals show every sign of maintaining
an appropriate balance between the rights of NAFTA investors to air their
complaints and the obligations of NAFTA Parties to regulate in the public
most Chapter 11
interest."); Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 64 ("Thus ....
tribunals have developed clear rules that strike a healthy balance between the
interests of foreign investors [and] the regulatory obligations of host states."); see
also DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 35 ("The [FSIA's] structure is designed to
balance the need for a remedy for injured parties and the need for protection for
foreign states against undue intrusion into the conduct by the foreign state of its
public affairs."); Brower, Removal from State Court Under the FSIA, supra note
18, at 4 ("In brief, the FSIA balances the rights of plaintiffs and defendants by
promoting the initiation of legitimate claims against foreign states, but limiting the
opportunities for harassment of foreign states.").
20. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 110 (2d ed. 1997)
("To a large degree, the history of civilization may be described as a gradual
evolution from a power-oriented approach, in the state of nature, towards a ruleoriented approach."); see also DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at xii ("In a very real
sense, the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and related
doctrines were part of the ongoing process of legalizing international relations and
world politics."); Brower & Steven, supra note 16, at 201-02 (describing NAFTA
Chapter 11 as a "rule-based investment regime" that will help to promote the "rule
of law" in international economic relations); Brower, Dynamic Laboratory, supra
note 6, at 251 (opining that the "raison d'tre" of NAFTA Chapter 11 is to
"provide a rule-based investment regime"); Scott R. Jablonski, NAFTA Chapter 11
Dispute Resolution and Mexico: A Healthy Mix of InternationalLaw, Economics
and Politics, 32 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 475, 534 (2004) (explaining that
Chapter 11 establishes a "neutral, rule-based dispute resolution mechanism for
investment disputes"); Justin Byrne, NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Implementing
True Rule-Based Diplomacy Through Direct Access, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 415, 422
(2000) (describing NAFTA Chapter 1 as a "good example of the implementation
of and commitment to rule-based diplomacy").
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least describe the law of state immunity as a potential template for

the refinement of investor-state arbitration.
Without making any claims regarding its superiority within the
genre of state immunity acts, one may further identify the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA")2 I as an appropriate

template for the development of investor-state arbitration. Despite
periodic complaints about inelegant draftsmanship,22 the statute has

supplied a generation of lawyers and judges with an effective
framework for managing a rising tide of private claims against
foreign states. 23 Its success depends, in no small part, on the skillful
resolution of six issues critically important to all systems that handle
large volumes of private claims against foreign states:
1. The suppression of vexatious litigation tactics;
2. The level of discretion granted to adjudicators;
3. The entitlement of states to claim the benefit of all doubt in

close cases;
4. The adoption of mechanisms to promote uniformity of
decision;
5. The rejection of post-judgment proceedings that
consistently threaten to rob claimants of their victories; and
21. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f),
1441(d), 1602-1611 (2000).
22. See United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d
1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 1994) (declaring a provision of the FSIA to be "hopelessly
ambiguous"); Callejo v. Bancomer S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1113 (5th Cir. 1985)
(labeling the FSIA as a "tangled web of statutory ambiguities"); Vencedora
Oceanica Navigacion, S.A., v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation,
730 F.2d 195, 205 (5th Cir. 1984) (pronouncing the FSIA to be a "peculiarly
twisted exercise in statutory draftsmanship"); Marianne D. Short & Charles H.
Brower, I, The Taming of the Shrew: May the Act of State Doctrine and Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Eat and Drink as Friends?, 20 HAMLINE L. REv. 723, 730
(1997) (observing that the FSIA's compression of distinct concepts has "provoked
criticism by jurists"); Working Group of the American Bar Association, Reforming
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 489, 492-93
(2002) (asserting that the FSIA's structure and language have challenged courts,
that some provisions seem awkwardly worded, and that other provisions lack any
real definition).
23. See Working Group of the American Bar Association, supra note 22, at 493
("As Congress hoped and expected, the courts have addressed and resolved many
of the problems with the FSIA.").
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6. The elimination of any role for political entities in the
decision-making process.
Having identified the relevant concepts, one may now describe their
application under the FSIA and reflect on the possible lessons for
investor-state arbitration.
First, in order to handle large volumes of private claims against
foreign states without provoking crisis, any system of adjudication
must take the steps necessary to suppress vexatious tactics.24 For
example, to relieve a perennial sore point in foreign relations, the
FSIA put an end to the common practice of seizing and attaching the
property of foreign states for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction."
Likewise, investment treaties recently concluded by the United
States allow the respondents to demand the summary adjudication of
cases that, while not completely frivolous, fail to state claims on
which relief may be granted.2 6 Those who wish to sustain the long-

24. Cf J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 277 (6th ed. 1963) (advocating the
establishment of a system that would allow individuals to bring claims against
states before international tribunals, provided that "proper safeguards against
merely frivolous or vexatious claims could be devised").
25. See Hearings,supra note 16, at 26, 28 (testimony of Monroe Leigh); H.R.
REP. No. 94-1487, at 8, 26-27 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606,
6625-26; S. REP. No. 94-13 10, at 9, 25-26 (1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 460 cmt. a (1987); Letter from
Ingersoll, supra note 18, at 112-13; DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 36, 208-09,
745.
26. See 2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 28(4)-(5)
[hereinafter U.S. Model BIT], available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/
othr/38602.htm (last visited July 11, 2005); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Oct. 25, 2004, U.S.-Uru., art. 28(4)-(5)
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
BIT],
U.S.-Uru.
[hereinafter
WorldRegions/Americas/South_America/UruguayBIT/asset uploadfile583_67
28.pdf (last visited July 11, 2005); Free Trade Agreement, June 15, 2004, U.S.Morocco, art. 10.19(4)-(5) [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/MoroccoFTA/FlnalText/
SectionIndex.html (last visited July 11, 2005); U.S.-Central American Free Trade
Agreement, May 28, 2004, art. 10.20(4)-(5) [hereinafter CAFTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinal_
Texts/SectionIndex.html (last visited July 11, 2005); Free Trade Agreement, June
6, 2003, U.S-Chile, art. 10.19(4)-(5) [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/FinalTexts/Section_
Index.html (last visited July 11, 2005); Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.Sing., art. 15.19(4)-(5) [hereinafter U.S.-Sing. FTA], available at http://www.ustr.
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term commitment of states-be it remembered that they are the
"perpetual respondents" in investor-state arbitration 1 7 -can only
welcome the prompt elimination of vexatious claims as a source of
friction.28
Second, the maintenance of a balance among various stakeholders
often precludes the use of exhaustive definitions29 and,
correspondingly, increases the level of discretion granted to
adjudicators.30 Accepting this principle, the FSIA's drafters deemed
it impractical and, indeed, "unwise" to define a commercial
activity,3 ' the single most important concept in the entire statute.32 In

gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/SingaporeFTA/FinalTexts/Section_Index.html
(last visited July 11, 2005).
27. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An
Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1381, 1410 (2003).
28. See Andrea Bjorklund, Contract Without Privily: Sovereign Offer and
Investor Acceptance, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 183, 191 (2001) (advising that "judicious
construction of both the procedural and substantive requirements of [NAFTA]
Chapter 11 will ensure that it survives to inform the next generation of dispute
settlement agreements"); Daniel M. Price, NAFTA Chapter 11-Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107, 114
(2001) (cautioning investors to exercise restraint in formulating claims and to
avoid the articulation of norms in ways that might provoke an unfortunate overreaction against a "fragile" institution).
29. See Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 87 (doubting the ability of treaty
negotiators and other draftsmen to "capture a complex balance of stakeholder
interests in simple rules as opposed to more open-textured standards").
30. See id. at 53, 63-64, 66 (explaining that the adoption of indeterminate legal
text often requires specification of concepts through judicial or other adjudicative
processes; thus, by adopting an obligation of "fair and equitable treatment"
towards foreign investors, the drafters of NAFTA Chapter 11 established "a
somewhat creative, rather than a purely analytical, charge for ad hoc tribunals");
see also Brower, The Empire Strikes Back, supra note 6, at 56 (asserting that the
"fair and equitable treatment" standard "represents the exemplification of an
intentionally vague term, designed to give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority
to articulate a variety of rules necessary to achieve the treaty's object and purpose
in [the context of] particular disputes").
31. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6615; S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 16 (1976); Letter from Ingersoll, supra note
18, at 105; Letter from William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, and Richard G.
Kleindienst, Attorney General, to President of the Senate (Jan. 22, 1973), reprinted
in 12 I.L.M. 118, 137 [hereinafter Letter from Rogers]; DELLAPENNA, supra note
18, at 369; see also HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 197 (2002)
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so doing, they openly acknowledged the expression of faith33 and the
conferral of discretion34 implicit in their decision. Likewise, until
recently, the drafters of investment treaties left undefined such
crucial phrases as "like circumstances," "fair and equitable
may
states
and
"expropriation. 35 Although
treatment,"
understandably recoil from the prospect of open-ended liability, one
may-as I shall suggest-moderate their exposure to risk without
resorting to exhaustive definition.36 As a result, one may question
whether the recent movement toward more detailed provisions3 7 and

(observing that the statute gives "no criterion... by which to determine whether
an activity is commercial"); Charles H. Brower, II, International Decision:
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 236, 239 (2005) (mentioning
that the FSIA never defines a commercial activity).
32. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 351 (explaining that the exception to
immunity for commercial activities lies at the "heart" of the statute); see also
Brower, supra note 31, at 239 (opining that a commercial activity represents the
concept most vital to FSIA's application).
33. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 53 (testimony of Monroe Leigh)
(acknowledging that "we have decided to put our faith in the U.S. courts to work
out progressively, on a case-by-case basis ... the distinction between commercial
and governmental" activities); id. (statement by Rep. Barbara Jordan) (expressing
the hope that the drafters' "trust would not be abused by the courts").
34. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 16, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615;
S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 16; Letter from Ingersoll, supra note 18, at 105 (all
recognizing that the absence of a textual definition vests courts a "great deal of
latitude in determining what is a 'commercial activity' for purposes of [the
FSIA]"); see also DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 369 (referring to "the large
measure of discretion courts have in determining whether to characterize the acts
that form the basis of a claim under section 1605(a)(2) as commercial or noncommercial").
35. See Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 60-61 (discussing the high level
of indeterminacy associated with these concepts under the NAFTA's investment
chapter).
36. See infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
37. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 26, arts. 5-6, Annexes A-B; U.S.-Uru.
BIT, supra note 26, arts. 5-6, Annexes A-B; U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 26,
arts. 10.5-10.6, Annexes 10-A, 10-B; CAFTA, supra note 26, arts. 10.5, 10.7,
Annexes 10-B, 10-C; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 26, arts. 10.4, 10.9, Annexes 10A, 10-D; U.S.-Sing. FTA, supra note 26, art. 15.6, Exchange of Letters on
Customary International Law, Exchange of Letters on Expropriation (all specifying
(1) the relationship among the minimum standard of treatment, treaty obligations,
customary international law, and general principles of law; and (2) the degree or
type of interference necessary to constitute an expropriation).
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away from the exercise of discretion represents a necessary or even a
desirable trend for investor-state arbitration.
Third, to compensate states for the uncertainty that accompanies
the conferral of discretion on adjudicators, states should have the
right to claim the benefit of all doubt in close cases. At first glance,
this statement may seem incompatible with a fundamental tenet of
procedural justice common to international law and international
arbitration: equal treatment of the parties.38 Nevertheless, one may
justify the proposed allocation of deference to states on procedural,
substantive, and practical grounds.
Procedurally, equal treatment of the parties does not-and
cannot-apply to the burden of proof. By allocating the burden of

38. See Canfor Corp. v. United States, Procedural Order No. 5,para. 22 (May
28, 2004) (emphasizing the tribunal's "duty to conduct the . . . proceeding
consistent with the principles of fairness and equality among the disputing
parties"), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/33109.pdf
(last visited Mar. 17, 2005); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Decision and Order by
the Tribunal, para. 16 n.6 (Mar. 11, 2002) (recounting the tribunal's obligation to
treat the disputing parties with equality), available at http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/Decision-Order-lMar02.PDF (last visited Mar.
17, 2005); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Decision by the Tribunal, para. 1.5
(Sept. 6, 2000) (describing equality of treatment as an "overriding principle"),
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/pubdoc8.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2005); U.N. INT'L L. COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE DRAFT
CONVENTION ON ARBITRAL PROCEDURE at 55, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/92, U.N. Sales

No. E.55.V.1 (1955) (designating equality of treatment as a "fundamental norm of
procedure"); BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 290 (1987) (identifying the "juridical

equality between the parties in their capacity as litigants" as a "cardinal
characteristic[] of a judicial process"); Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra
note 6, at 486 (describing equal treatment of the parties as a fundamental tenet of
procedural justice and a rule of international law); Charles H. Brower, II,
International Immunities: Some Dissident Views on the Role ofMunicipal Courts,
41 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 87 (2000) (identifying equal treatment of the parties as one of
the few "commonly accepted requirements of procedural justice at the international
level"); Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 76 (recognizing "equality of
treatment of the parties" as "the most fundamental tenet of procedural justice
common to international law, Chapter 11, and the pertinent rules of arbitration");
John P. Gaffney, Due Process inthe World Trade Organization, 14 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 1173, 1179, 1195 (1999) (declaring equal treatment of the parties to be an
internationally accepted rule of procedural justice).
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proof to claimants,3 9 domestic and international tribunals create firm
presumptions that respondent states act lawfully,4 0 thus allowing
them to claim the benefit of the doubt in close cases. Substantively,
private investors and host states do not possess equivalent rights and
obligations under international law.4" As the principal actors in the
international legal system and as the guardians of the public interest
within their own borders, states legitimately may demand a
significant measure of deference in any substantive evaluation of
their public acts.42 Far from being controversial, this principle
routinely, if indirectly, finds voice in the demanding standards for
establishing liability for an expropriation4 3 or a violation of the

39. See CHENG, supra note
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 194

38, at 327; J.L.
(1959).

SIMPSON

&

HAZEL

Fox,

40. See CHENG, supra note 38, at 305-06; JACKSON H. RALSTON,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 80 (1929); SIMPSON &
Fox, supra note 39, at 195, 197.
41. See TOOPE, supra note 18, at 262 (indicating that private foreign investors
do not have the same legal status as their host states).
42. See id. at 390-91.
43. See, e.g., Azinian v. Mexico, Award, para. 87, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1, 1999) (declining to construe the NAFTA's provision on
expropriation in a manner that would elevate "a multitude of ordinary transactions
with public authorities into potential international disputes"), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/robertaward.pdf (last visited Mar. 17,
2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 192 cmt. b (1965) ("Conduct attributable to a state may deprive an
alien's property of value without constituting a taking."); IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

509 (6th ed. 2003) (observing that "[s]tate

measures ... may affect foreign interests considerably without amounting to
expropriation"); Brower, supra note 17, at 68 (mentioning the high level of
tolerance for interference with property rights under international law, and
suggesting that many of the expropriation claims brought under NAFTA's
investment chapter "are doomed to failure"); G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a
Taking of Property Under InternationalLaw?, 1962 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 318
(recognizing situations in which "interference, although very substantial, has been
held not to constitute a 'taking"'); Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the
State: Recent Developments in InternationalLaw, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259,
331 (1982 III) (stating that "interferences with property for economic and financial
regulatory purposes are tolerated to a significant degree"); Philip C. Jessup,
Confiscation, 21 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 38, 39 (1927) (warning against the
"hasty" condemnation of governmental measures that injuriously affect property
rights).
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international minimum standard of treatment. 44 Practically, to the
extent that their long-term survival depends on the consent of states,
systems for the adjudication of private claims against foreign states
must, within the limits of principled decision-making, find ways to
accommodate the rights, duties, and long-term interests of those
states.

45

Consistent with the procedural, substantive, and practical
justifications for incremental deference to foreign states, the FSIA's
drafters intentionally adopted a presumption of immunity as a means
of protecting foreign states from liability in doubtful cases.46
Likewise, investor-state tribunals should take seriously Yves
Fortier's recent articulation of a similar concept: "caveat investor!"47
Fourth, to further compensate states for the uncertainty that
accompanies discretion and to protect states from the embarrassment
of disparate treatment, systems for the adjudication of private claims
against them should incorporate features that promote a uniformity

44. See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, Award, para. 127, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2 (Oct. 11, 2002) (defining the international minimum standard by
inquiring "whether, at an international level and having regard to generally
acceptable standards of administrative justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light
of all the facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and
discreditable"), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1444
2.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, paras.
261-64 (Nov. 13, 2000) (recognizing the "high measure of deference that
international law generally extends to ...domestic authorities to regulate matters

within their ...borders," and declining to use the minimum standard as a tool to
"second-guess" the controversial policy choices of a host state), available at
http://www.appletonlaw.com/cases/Myers%20-%2OFinal%20Merits%20Award.
pdf (last visited July 17, 2005); Brower, supra note 17, at 84 (observing that when
called to apply the minimum standard under NAFTA's investment chapter,
tribunals "have uniformly shown deference to domestic institutions").
45. TOOPE, supra note 18, at 389.
46. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 17 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6616; S.REP. No. 94-1310, at 16-17 (1976); Letter from Ingersoll, supra
note 18, at 106; Letter from Rogers, supra note 31, at 137; DELLAPENNA, supra
note 18, at 35, 324, 643-44.
47. L. Yves Fortier, Caveat Investor: The Meaning of "Expropriation"and the
Protection Afforded Investors Under NAFTA, NEWS FROM ICSID, Summer 2003,
at 1, 13, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/news_20-1.pdf (last
visited July 11, 2005).
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of decision.48 For example, to develop a more consistent and
systematic body of law, the FSIA's drafters first channeled all claims
against foreign states into federal courts49 and, then, eliminated the
possibility of jury trials.5 0 With all due respect, one might draw a
comparison of sorts between U.S. juries and ad hoc tribunals.
Despite their sterling qualifications, 5 which remain above question,
and their professional disposition of individual cases, ad hoc
tribunals share the institutional tendency of juries to produce clusters
of decisions with a deficit of consistency and a surplus of arbitrary
distinctions."
Thus, upon reading the Metalclad and the Loewen awards as
bookends, one struggles to reconcile the conflicting images of
NAFTA's investment chapter, on the one hand, as a ground48. See Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 52 (discussing the role of
"coherence" as a factor supporting the legitimacy of international legal regimes).
49. See Hearings, supra note 16, at 35, 36 (testimony of Monroe Leigh and
Bruno A. Ristau); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13, 32, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6611, 6631; S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 11-12; Letter from Ingersoll,
supra note 18, at 102, 117; Letter from Rogers, supra note 31, at 157;
DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 34; ANDREw DICKINSON ET AL., STATE IMMUNITY
219, 224 (2004).
50. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 661112; S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 11-12; DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 661;
DICKINSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 221.
51. See Brower & Steven, supra note 16, at 200 ("The arbitrators participating
in these cases are highly competent members of academia and the international
bar, with experience and expertise in the relevant areas of law exceeding that of the
vast majority of the domestic judiciary in each of the three NAFTA countries.");
see also Canada v. S.D. Myers, Inc., 2004 F.C. 38, 2004 CarsweliNat 94, para. 16
(Can. Fed. Ct.) (characterizing one tribunal's members as "knowledgeable,
experienced and distinguished in international law, international trade law and
international arbitration"); United Mexican States v. Karpa, 2003 CarswellOnt
4929, para. 90 (Ont. Super. Ct. J.) (noting that another tribunal "was made up of
highly respected individuals with expertise in the field of international commercial
arbitration"), available at 2003 WL 22846522; Brower, The Empire Strikes Back,
supra note 6, at 78 (suggesting that the relevant experience of a third tribunal
noticeably exceeded that of its counterparts on the North American bench).
52. See Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 66-69 (discussing the problem of
inconsistent decisions rendered by tribunals under NAFTA's investment chapter
and opining that "the uncoordinated commitment of creative lawmaking to a series
of ad hoc tribunals creates a considerable likelihood of incoherent results"); see
also Brower et al., The Coming Crisis, supra note 6, at 424 (heralding the
"appearance of multiple and conflicting arbitral awards based on the same facts").
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breaking, risk-shifting device swept clean of procedural obstacles
and, on the other hand, as a peripheral, extraordinary remedy laden
with traps for the unwary.53 Then, after comparing the Lauder/CME
awards,5 4 the possibility dawns that selection of the tribunal-like
53. Compare Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, paras. 74, 76, 97 n.4, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/I (2000) (rejecting exhaustion of local remedies as a
procedural requirement under NAFTA's investment chapter, defining "fair and
equitable treatment" to include an element of transparency that requires states
promptly to remove any room for doubt with respect to laws governing foreign
investment and, thus, arguably shifting from the investor to the host state the entire
risk of uncertainty with respect to the host state's legal system), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/mm-award-e.pdf (last visited June 2, 2005),
with Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, paras. 132, 137, 151-57, 165-71, 21017, 220-39, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (2003) (defining the international
minimum standard only to prohibit "clearly improper and discreditable" actions by
host states and determining that a Mississippi state court fell below that standard,
but dismissing the claim because the investor neglected to petition the United
States Supreme Court for discretionary review and because, during the arbitral
proceedings, the Canadian investor emerged from bankruptcy as a U.S. company),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf (last visited
June 3, 2005).
54. Ronald Lauder, a U.S. national, controlled CME Czech Republic BV
(CME), a Dutch corporation that made an investment in a Czech television
company. Following allegations of unlawful state interference with the investment,
Lauder commenced an arbitration against the Czech Republic under the U.S.Czech BIT. Thereafter, CME commenced an arbitration against the Czech
Republic before a different tribunal under the Dutch-Czech BIT. The first tribunal
denied Lauder's claim on the grounds that he failed to establish a causal link
between the Czech Republic's actions and Lauder's damages. On essentially the
same facts, the second tribunal reached the opposite conclusion, imposed liability
on the Czech Republic for de facto expropriation of CME's assets, and ultimately
awarded $269,814,000. Compare Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award, para.
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
3,
2001),
(Sept.
313
LauderAward.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005), with CME Czech Republic BV v.
Czech Republic, Partial Award, para. 575 (Sept. 13, 2001), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2001PartialAward.pdf (last visited Mar. 5,
2005), and CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech Republic, Final Award, paras. 44647 (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003Final_000.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). For additional discussions of the
Lauder/CME awards, see Brower et al., The Coming Crisis, supra note 6, at 42428; Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin
America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L.
301, 350-52 (2004); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Investment Arbitration Under ICSID and
UNCITRAL Rules: Prerequisites,Applicable Law, Review of Awards, 19 ICSID
REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2004); see also M. Rushton, Clifford Chance
Entangled in Bitter Lauder Arbitrations,LEGAL Bus., Oct. 2001, at 108 (quoting
Clifford Chance partner Jeremy Carver for the proposition that the conflicting
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jury selection-plays a role more dispositive and less unifying than
the text of the treaty obligations. When combined with the discretion
granted to tribunals, the growing volume of disputes, and their
importance to ever broader constituencies, the use of ad hoc tribunals
without coordinating mechanisms seems likely to provoke crisis. 5
Therefore, without foreclosing the consideration of alternatives, one
should praise the new wave of treaties that contemplate the
6
establishment of appellate bodies for investor-state arbitration.1
Fifth, although the point should be obvious, no system for the

adjudication of private claims against states can secure the
confidence of potential users by adopting post-judgment proceedings
that consistently threaten to rob them of the fruit of their victories.
For example, before enactment of the FSIA, the United States
applied the doctrine of restrictive immunity to claims against foreign
states, but the doctrine of absolute immunity to the execution of
resulting judgments,5 7 thereby hurling even the most exquisite
awards "bring[] the law into disrepute, [and] bring[] arbitration into disrepute-the
whole thing is highly regrettable").
55. See Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 66-67 (expressing concern about
the "uncoordinated commitment of creative lawmaking to a series of ad hoc
tribunals"); Sacerdoti, supra note 54, at 1-2 (warning that the "intricate, noncoordinated network of BITs" could generate conflicts that might trigger a
"backlash to the legal security surrounding international investments").
56. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 26, art. 28(10), Annex D; U.S.-Uru. BIT,
supra note 26, art. 28(10), Annex E; U.S.-Morocco FTA, supra note 26, art.
10.19(10), Annex 10-D; CAFTA, supra note 26, art. 10.20(1), Annex 10-F; U.S.Chile FTA, supra note 26, art. 10.19(10), Annex 10-H; U.S.-Sing. FTA, supra note
26, art. 15.19(10), accompanying exchange of letters; see also Frederick M.
Abbott, The Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the
Law and the Boundaries of North American Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 303, 308 (2000); Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 91-93;
William S. Dodge, InternationalDecision: Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 910, 918 (2001) (all endorsing the establishment of a standing appellate
body for disputes brought under NAFTA's investment chapter). In recent months,
two prominent international organizations have begun to discuss the possibility of
establishing an appellate body for arbitration proceedings brought under
investment treaties. See Enforcement, Review and Appeal Mechanisms in InvestorState Dispute Settlement: Background Note by the OECD Secretariat (2004) (on
file with author); Possible Improvements of the Frameworkfor ICSID Arbitration:
ICSID SecretariatDiscussion Paper 14-16 (Oct. 22, 2004) (on file with author).
57. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8, 27 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606, 6626; S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 27 (1976); Letter from
Rogers, supra note 31, at 121; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
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victories back into the jaws of defeat.5 8 To ensure a greater
coincidence of moral and practical victories for the vast run of cases,
the FSIA's drafters established a closer alignment between the rules
on immunity from jurisdiction and the rules on immunity from
execution of judgments.5 9 Turning to investor-state arbitration, one
must insist on a similar congruence between the awards of tribunals
and their enforcement by municipal courts. Because they would
prevent the establishment of that congruence, one must condemn the
efforts of Canada and Mexico to establish a system for judicial
review of the merits of awards issued by Chapter 11 tribunals.6°
Conversely, one should recognize Canada's Federal Court and
Ontario's provincial courts for serving as dependable bulwarks
against such trends.61
Sixth, and finally, all systems for the adjudication of private
claims against foreign states must eliminate any role whatsoever for
political entities in the process for resolving individual claims.62
Before the FSIA's enactment, U.S. courts followed a practice of

LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 469, reporters' note 4 (1987); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 69 reporters'

note 2 (1965); Brower, supra note 31, at 238 n.42.
58. See Letter from Rogers, supra note 31, at 121 (observing that the prevailing
system could deny plaintiffs the fruit of their judgments against foreign states).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8, 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6606, 6626; S. REP. No. 94-13 10, at 27; Letter from Rogers, supra note 31, at 121;
DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 34, 744; Fox, supra note 31, at 186. Compare 28
U.S.C. § 1605 (2000) (exceptions to immunity from jurisdiction), with § 1610
(exceptions to immunity from execution). But see Working Group of the American
Bar Association, supra note 22, at 586 (calling for steps to close the remaining
gaps between rules on immunity from jurisdiction and rules on immunity from
execution).
60. See Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 6, at 484-85; Brower, The
Empire Strikes Back, supra note 6, at 61-88; Brower, Legitimacy, supra note 6, at
75-78.
61. See Canada v. S.D. Myers, Inc., 2004 F.C. 38, 2004 CarswellNat 94, paras.
35-38 (Can. Fed. Ct. 2004); United Mexican States v. Karpa, 2003 CarswellOnt
4929 (Ont. Super. Ct. J.), available at 2003 WL 22846522, aff'd, 2005
CarswellOnt 32, availableat 2005 WL 95624 (all rejecting Canada's and Mexico's
efforts to secure annulment of awards rendered in favor of claimants under
NAFTA's investment chapter).
62. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (identifying "depoliticization" as
a key objective shared by investor-state arbitration and the FSIA).
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deferring to the Executive Branch's "suggestions" of immunity, thus
establishing a critical role for the State Department in the disposition
of claims against foreign states.63 Finding itself in the incongruous

"position of a political institution trying to apply... legal standard[s]

to litigation already before the courts,"' the Department periodically
succumbed to the temptations of political expediency.6 5 In hearings
before Congress, the State Department's Legal Adviser candidly
described "this consideration of political factors [as] the very
antithesis of the rule of law which we would like to see
established. 6 6 To redress this aberration, the FSIA's drafters
transferred immunity determinations from the Executive Branch to
the exclusive competence of the Judicial Branch.67 In so doing, they
expressed their desire to assure litigants that "crucial decisions are
made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that [e]nsure due
process. 68
Returning for the last time to investor-state arbitration, the FSIA's
aspirations reverberate in NAFTA's investment chapter, Article 1115
of which expressly refers to the establishment of "a mechanism for
the settlement of investment disputes that assures . . . due process
before an impartial tribunal."6 9 Despite these inspiring words, the
NAFTA Parties have used "Notes of Interpretation"7 not only to

63. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689-91 (2004) (quoting
and discussing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487-88
(1983)); Brower, supra note 31, at 237.
64. Hearings,supra note 16, at 26 (testimony of Monroe Leigh); H.R. REP. No.
94-1487, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6607; see also Fox, supra note
31, at 186.
65. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 18, at 29-30; Fox, supra note 31, at 186;
Brower, supra note 31, at 237; Short & Brower, supra note 22, at 729.
66. Hearings,supra note 16, at 35 (testimony of Monroe Leigh).
67. See id. at 26-27 (testimony of Monroe Leigh); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606; S.REP. No. 94-13 10, at 9; Fox, supra
note 31, at 186; Brower, supra note 31, at 237.
68. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606.
69. NAFTA, supra note 17, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
70. Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, § B, July 31, 2001, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/NAFTA-Interpr-e.asp (last visited June 22, 2005); see also NAFTA, supra
note 17, art. 1131(2), 32 I.L.M. at 646 (requiring tribunals to apply interpretations
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preempt the anticipated imposition of liability in pending claims,7 1

but also to force the reconsideration of a partial award12 that had
become res judicata and that, truth be told, the tribunal had no power
to reopen. 3 Responding to such crude assertions of unrefined power,
one feels the temptation to invoke the Legal Adviser's previously
stated views on "consideration of political factors" and the
"antithesis of the rule of law. 74 One may, however, turn to the
European Court of Human Rights for even more potent ammunition.
For example, Stran Greek Refineries involved a case in which the
Greek legislature promulgated an authoritative interpretation of a
decree on the eve of a hearing in order to defeat litigation relating to

an investment claim then pending against the Greek government in
Greek courts. 75 The European Court of Human Rights wasted no time
of the NAFTA adopted by the Free Trade Commission, which consists of the three
NAFTA Parties acting in concert through cabinet-level representatives).
71. See Brower, Beware the Jabberwock, supra note 6, at 485; Brower,
Legitimacy, supra note 6, at 81.
72. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, paras.
8-16, 48-69 (May 31, 2002) (revisiting a partial award's determination of liability
in light of the NAFTA Parties' intervening adoption of the Notes of Interpretation),
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/damageaward.pdf
(last visited Mar. 5, 2005); see also Brower et al., The Coming Crisis, supra note 6,
at 434 (describing how Canada used the Notes of Interpretation to force the Pope
& Talbot tribunal to reopen the merits of its decision against Canada); Brower,
Dynamic Laboratory, supra note 6, at 257 (recounting how Canada used the Notes
of Interpretation to compel the tribunal to "reopen[] the merits of a decision against
Canada").
73. See SIR MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 405 (2d ed. 1989) (explaining the consequences of rendering an
interim award, whereby the tribunal becomes "functus officio as regards matters
dealt with in the award" and therefore "loses power to alter the award without the
consent of the parties"); DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON & JUDITH GILL, RUSSELL ON
ARBITRATION 235 (22d ed. 2003) (opining that an award "dealing only with
particular issues" is "final and binding" with respect to "the issues disposed of by
it" and, therefore, the tribunal "does not have power either to reopen its award at
some later stage" or to "make a subsequent determination of issues previously
disposed of in an interim award"); see also JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL.,
634 (2003)
ARBITRATION
COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE
(recognizing that a partial award "terminates the proceedings in respect of the
specific issues decided").
74. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
75. See Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, 301-04, 320-21
(1995).
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in branding such political intervention as a denial of the right to a fair
76
trial and an affront to the rule of law.
Having witnessed the conduct of the NAFTA Parties, one might
with great sadness declare Article 1115 to be a paper commitment to
the rule of law. Yet, even that would understate the gravity of the
problem for, without fanfare, the inspiring language of that provision
has vanished from the U.S. Model BIT and every investment treaty
recently concluded by the United States.7" Apparently, the
commitment to the rule of law no longer exists, even on paper. For
those who desire to avoid crisis, this hardly portends a healthy turn
of events.78
Nonetheless, I conclude on a note of optimism. Just as children
can grow stronger and more beautiful in the face of adversity,79 so
may arbitration emerge from crisis renewed. To accomplish this feat,
its supporters must do no more, but also no less, than to rediscover a
handful of sensible principles that we once knew, but seem to have
forgotten along the way.

76. See id. at 322-23.
77. Compare NAFTA, supra note 17, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642, with U.S.
Model BIT, supra note 26, and U.S.-Uru. BIT, supra note 26, and U.S.-Morocco
FTA, supra note 26, and CAFTA, supra note 26, and U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note
26, and U.S.-Sing. FTA, supra note 26.
78. Cf Brower, supra note 31, at 242; Charles H. Brower, II, The Lives of
Animals, the Lives of Prisoners, and the Revelations of Abu Ghraib, 37 VAND. J.

L. 1353, 1356 (2004) (both discussing events that suggest a waning
commitment to international law, and even to the rule of law, throughout the
United States and its three branches of government).
79. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 46 (observing that "a child is strengthened by
overcoming difficulties").
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